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 Abstract 
Using data from the Stockholm Stock Exchange we study the value added by (as distinct from the abnormal 
returns to) analysts’ recommendations. Recommending brokers’ clients trade profitably around positive 
recommendations at the expense of other brokers’ clients. Significant profits come from transactions before 
recommendation dates. Value added is greatest for upgrades to large caps, and largely insignificant for 
downgrades and recommendations of small caps, despite high abnormal returns. Brokers making profitable 
recommendations generate abnormally high commission income, recouping much of their clients’ abnormal 
profits, and their abnormal commission income varies in line with the abnormal profits for their clients. 
 
Keywords: stock recommendations; performance evaluation; information leakages. 
JEL codes: G14; G24; J44. 
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I. Introduction 
Equity research is an expression of investment expertise. Research analysts deploy this expertise 
by evaluating and recommending stocks in an effort to help their clients outperform the market. In return, 
brokers providing this expertise are typically rewarded by trading commissions which are a cost to those 
who act on the investment advice. 
The recommendation literature, starting with Cowles (1933), has traditionally assessed the value 
of recommendations to investors by measuring price reactions or abnormal returns to recommendations 
(see, e.g., Diefenbach (1972), Bidwell (1977), Stickel (1995), Womack (1996), Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, 
and Trueman (2001), Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004) and Green (2006)). These studies tend to 
show the existence of substantial abnormal returns to recommendation revisions or revision-based strategies. 
However, as Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) argue in connection with mutual funds, abnormal returns do 
not measure value added any more than the internal rate of return measures the value added by a project. 
Abnormal returns and price reactions are certainly relevant, but so are the quantities that can be traded at 
each price. 
In this paper we analyze the value added of recommendations and seek to identify who captures it. 
We measure the value of recommendations, including any information released by the analyst related to the 
recommendation or specific to the stock being recommended, in terms of the abnormal profits obtained by 
those who trade on them. We compute abnormal profits as the product of the daily net trades of the 
recommending brokers’ clients in the recommended stock and the abnormal return of the recommended 
stock. Thus, these trade- based abnormal profits capture the profits made by investors trading in 
recommended stocks in excess of what they could have made had they invested in a broad market index 
instead. Measuring value added in this way presents its challenges. Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) 
similarly define the value added by a mutual fund as the fund’s gross excess return over benchmark 
multiplied by its assets under management (AUM). Mutual fund excess returns can be calculated 
straightforwardly using the daily prices at which everyone deals, and these prices, together with the funds’ 
AUM, are a matter of public record. For stock recommendations we require volume and price data for 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2719737 
2 
 
individual stocks, but we also need a way of separating the trading which is generated by a stock 
recommendation from that which is not. 
To address these challenges, we combine recommendations with volumes transacted and prices 
paid by each broker on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE). The SSE, a pure limit order book market 
with brokerage firms as members, is a particularly suitable exchange on which to analyze broker trading 
flows, counterparties, and profits. As client trades are executed between members without passing through 
dealers or specialists, we can establish a direct link between the trades executed by a brokerage firm and 
the stock recommendations it issues. For every day and each stock, our data reveal the volumes and prices 
as well as the broker identities behind the trades. This allows us to calculate daily positions at the broker 
level for each stock and the actual price paid (obtained) to open (close) those positions and, in turn, infer 
the excess profits made by the clients of recommending brokers without having to make assumptions about 
the investability of the stocks being recommended or the prices investors could trade at. By relying on 
trading data to infer investors’ response to recommendations, the analysis is also less sensitive to any timing 
mismatches between clients’ access to recommendation information and the reported date of the 
recommendation. These mismatches could reflect information leakages, postdating of recommendations, 
or tipping to selected clients – all of which are observationally equivalent in our analysis. 
In the ten-year period covered by our study we find abnormal profits to upgrades to buy or strong 
buy for the clients of recommending brokers of SEK 510,200 (USD 76,500) per recommendation. The 
abnormal profits we identify are concentrated around days on which analysts are reported to release 
upgrades. We do not detect abnormal profits for the clients of recommending brokers outside the narrow 
recommendation window. These profits are matched by identical negative profits obtained by the rest of 
the market. 
In order to control for possible clientele effects, we segment brokers into three categories for each 
stock and each recommendation window. We call brokers which issue a change of recommendation on that 
stock during the window “recommending brokers.” We call the other brokers who cover the stock and have 
an outstanding recommendation on it but do not change that recommendation during that window 
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“informed.” The only difference between these categories is that, for a given stock, brokers in the first 
category make a recommendation in a given window and those in the second do not. The informed category 
is thus an appropriate control group for recommending brokers (they are, in fact, the same brokers but with 
different labels at different times). We call the third category, which consists of brokers with no coverage 
of the stock in question, “uninformed.” 
Clients of the control group of informed brokers (i.e. brokers with coverage of the stock which do 
not make a recommendation on it during the analyzed window) do not execute profitable transactions during 
the recommendation window, and it is the clients of uninformed brokers (i.e. those with no coverage of the 
recommended stock) who tend to stand on the other side of recommendation-motivated trades. The 
concentration of abnormal profits for the clients of recommending brokers within a narrow +/- 5-day 
window around the recommendation change (and nowhere else) and the fact that the control group of 
informed brokers do not deliver profits for their clients, suggest that the abnormal profits we identify are 
related to analysts’ recommendations and are not just the result of existing differences in broker clients’ 
ability or information. An analysis of isolated recommendation revisions, alternatively defined as those 
issued away from earnings announcement dates or other recommendations, provides further support for this 
conclusion. 
Approximately half of the profits we identify are generated by transactions that take place before 
the recorded recommendation date. Our results also indicate that broker clients profit from upgrades to buy 
or strong buy but not from downgrades to sell or strong sell. Their inability to profit from these downgrades 
does not reflect inaction on their part: the substantial selling activity around downgrades signals that brokers’ 
customers do try to take advantage of them. Our analysis suggests, instead, that downgrades to sell or strong 
sell do not contain as much exploitable information, and may in some cases simply be a response to recent 
news. We also find that, for small-cap stocks, profits from both upgrades and downgrades are insignificant, 
reflecting low levels of recommendation- motivated trading volumes in these stocks. 
The reported profits made by the clients of recommending brokers are net of the costs of the bid-
ask spread and the price impact of trading, although not of brokerage commissions, which can be thought 
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of as a payment for that investment advice. Our results show that abnormal brokerage commission income 
generated by brokers from recommendation-motivated trades is (as a lower bound) around 40% to 60% of 
the abnormal profits made by the clients who follow their recommendations (the commission rate we have 
is for institutional clients only, which corresponds to the main target audience of brokers’ 
recommendations). Moreover, abnormal commission income to brokers varies in line with abnormal profits 
to their clients. Thus both brokers’ commission income and clients’ profits are larger for upgrades than 
downgrades, larger for trades before rather than after recommendation changes, and greater for large cap 
stocks than small cap stocks. In these respects, brokers can be seen as recouping a significant fraction of 
the profits their clients make by following their recommendations. 
Our paper makes a number of contributions to the existing literature. We propose a new way of 
estimating the value of security research by using trading data. Like Barber et al. (2001), we take an 
investor-oriented, calendar-time perspective, but, in line with Berk and van Binsbergen (2015), we also 
stress that a measure of recommendation value should account only for the trading profits obtained by those 
who receive recommendations. 
We apply this approach to the profits made by investors who trade on recommendations issued on 
stocks listed on the SSE and we obtain results that are not always consistent with those of traditional 
abnormal return methodologies. The discrepancy can be seen along three dimensions: the timing of 
recommendations, the direction of recommendations, and the size of the stock recommended. The fact that 
half of the abnormal profits in our analysis are made before the recommendation is released, coupled with 
evidence that recommending brokers’ market shares and net trades increase before the release of 
recommendations, points to pre-record date access to recommendations. Our finding that the clients of 
recommending brokers profit from upgrades but not downgrades suggests that downgrades are 
uninformative, arrive too late, or are communicated in a way that does not allow customers to easily take 
advantage of them. The result that abnormal profits to both upgrades and downgrades of small caps are 
negligible, despite the large abnormal returns to these recommendation changes, points to the lack of 
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investability and the large cost of trading in small caps, which are well documented in the literature (see 
e.g., Keim and Madhavan (1997), Stickel (1985), Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004), and Green (2006)). 
The abnormal profit methodology we use allows for the fact that it may be difficult to pinpoint the 
time when recommendations are accessible to clients, due to information leakages and pre-release of their 
content to selected clients (see e.g., Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett (2007), Juergens and Lindsey (2009), 
Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010), Busse, Green, and Jegadeesh (2012), and Kadan, Michaely, and 
Moulton (2018)) and imprecise dating in commercial databases (see e.g., Womack (1996) and Hoechle, 
Schaub, and Schmidt (2015)). This is particularly relevant since the first practice, known as tipping, was 
not, during our sample period, explicitly prohibited in Sweden (see Internet Appendix for details) and dating 
imprecision, although it varies depending on the data provider and country, is generally significant in non-
US data. Our methodology also allows naturally to control for the release of contemporaneous public news 
(Altinkiliç and Hansen (2009)). 
Finally, our paper is the first to compare the realized profits of equity research with the extra 
commissions arising from these recommendations for the brokers that make them. The fact that 
recommending brokers capture extra commission revenues of (at a lower bound) some 40% to 60% of the 
value of the profits made by their clients and that the extra commission revenues vary in line with the 
profitability of recommendations parallels the findings of Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) that the gains 
from mutual fund management accrue to the managers themselves. In both cases the rewards to investment 
expertise are captured to a large extent by those who possess it. Our findings are also consistent with 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Gârleanu and Pedersen (2018): brokers are rewarded for gathering and 
processing information as this information allows them to exploit (small) inefficiencies in securities prices. 
In our case the brokers are rewarded indirectly, that is, via commissions, and share the rewards with their 
clients. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the data used in 
the study. Section 3 formally discusses the methodology to evaluate the value added by recommendations, 
and presents our results on trading and profits. Section 4 summarizes the main findings and concludes. 
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II. Data Description 
Our study combines three main data sets: stock recommendations, trading data and stock prices and 
returns. We collect recommendations of stocks listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE) from the 
Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES), and the SSE trading data is provided by the owner of the 
exchange, Nasdaq OMX. We obtain stock return and supplementary information from Datastream. Each of 
these data sets is described in detail below. 
A. Broker Trading Data 
This study uses proprietary Swedish equity trading data sourced directly from the Stockholm Stock 
Exchange. The SSE is a fully electronic limit order book market where members (broker firms) pay both 
fixed and transaction based fees for matching of order flow. The daily trading data we obtain spans the 
period from January 1997 to June 2006 (later data has not been made available by the SSE). For each trading 
date, stock and member of the exchange we observe the number of trades executed, the number of shares 
traded (volume) and the value of those trades, measured in Swedish kronor (SEK), all of them broken up 
on purchases, sales, and internal trading. 
The key advantage of using Swedish trading data is that it allows us to identify the brokers 
executing the trades over a relatively long period of time (almost ten years). The SSE seems also a 
particularly suitable exchange on which to measure broker trading flows. As client trades are executed 
between members without passing through dealers or specialists, we can establish a direct link between the 
trades handled by a brokerage firm and the stock recommendations it issues. Sweden also has a well-
developed and competitive stock market. At the end of our sample period, the total market capitalization of 
the 417 companies listed in the SSE was SEK 3,507 (USD 438) billion, making Sweden the 12th largest 
stock market in the world at the time, according to the World Federation of Exchanges. The members of 
the SSE include large domestic brokers such as Enskilda Securities, Swedbank, and Carnegie, as well as 
major U.S. and European firms such as Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, Deutsche Bank, and UBS. Domestic 
and international brokerage firms compete for trades in several large companies such as Ericsson, Nokia, 
Volvo, Astra Zeneca, and H&M. Many companies have cross-listings on foreign stock exchanges, and are 
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therefore of interest to a wide group of international investors. Competition among brokers is stiff and 
increased during our sample period. In 1997, there were 50 unique members of the exchange, of which the 
top 10 accounted for 73% of the total value of share trading.1 In contrast, in 2006 there were 70 members, 
of which the top 10 had only 58% of the market share. This development has been primarily driven by a 
higher degree of competition from international brokers. 
B. Stock Recommendations 
We obtain data on financial analysts’ stock recommendations from the Institutional Brokers 
Estimate System (IBES) database for the period January 1997 to June 2006. 2  We concentrate on 
recommendation revisions, as opposed to recommendation levels. Revisions are discrete and salient events 
and previous research generally finds that they have significant information content (Womack (1996), 
Francis and Soffer (1997), Jegadeesh et al. (2004), Sorescu and Subrahmanyam (2006)). To construct the 
recommendation revision variable we rely on IBES recommendations’ classification. IBES classifies 
recommendations into five categories, from 1 to 5, which are usually interpreted along the following lines: 
(1) strong buy, (2) buy, (3) hold, (4) sell and (5) strong sell. We concentrate on two types of 
recommendation revisions: upgrades to buy or strong buy (upgrades) and downgrades to sell or strong sell 
(downgrades). An upgrade (downgrade) is defined as a buy (sell) or strong buy (strong sell) 
recommendation issued by an analyst whose previous recommendation on the stock was not as positive 
                                                 
1 Several members of the exchange have foreign subsidiaries registered also as members. We define unique members 
by identifying the brokers who belong to the same company or group and treating the group as a unit. 
2 We work with a recent download of IBES to avoid the issues raised by Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2009). To 
check the timing accuracy of the IBES data, we compared IBES recommendation dates with dates from analyst reports 
on Investext. Where we had data from both sources, the majority of the dates matched; unmatched dates suggested 
coding errors or batch reporting. Almost all the differences were such the Investext dates were within +/- 3 days of 
the IBES dates, well within our narrowest window of +/- 5 days. The discrepancies we found between IBES and 
Investext are similar to those found by Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) for other major markets. 
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(negative) as the current recommendation. Upgrades and downgrades defined in this way are unambiguous 
in the sense that both the change in recommendation and the level after the change point in the same 
direction; thus Hold to Buy counts as an upgrade, whereas Strong Sell to Sell (where the change points up 
but the level after the change points down) does not. Note also that the analyst issuing the recommendation 
is required to have an outstanding or previous recommendation on the same stock in order to consider the 
current recommendation as a revision.3  
The original sample consists of 10,935 recommendations of which 2,883 are upgrades and 2,038 
are downgrades. These recommendations revisions cover 296 firms. The sample includes recommendations 
revisions by 699 analysts or teams of analysts and 42 brokerage firms (of which just over 30% are Swedish). 
The 10 largest brokers in the sample, defined according to trading volume, are responsible for slightly more 
than 50% of all recommendation revisions. 
The distribution of recommendations in our sample is broadly similar to the distribution of 
recommendations in G7 countries during a similar period (excluding the U.S.), as reported by Jegadeesh 
and Kim (2006). In particular, Buy and Strong Buy recommendations outnumber Sell and Strong Sells, but 
not as noticeably as in the U.S. during the same sample period. Table 1 reports the recommendation 
transition matrix. Revisions in our sample are more or less evenly distributed along the 10-year period we 
study, to the point that there seems to be no significant correlation between the number and type of revisions 
and the general market conditions. 
                                                 
3 Positive and negative recommendation signals have been defined using a number of alternative criteria in the 
literature.   Our definitions of upgrades to buy or strong buy and downgrades to sell or strong sell are broadly similar 
to those employed by Elton, Gruber, and Grossman (1986), Stickel (1995), and Womack (1996) among others, with 
other studies basing their classifications instead on the direction of the recommendations change (regardless of the 
level), the level of the change (regardless of the direction), or a different combination of both. In the Internet Appendix 
we report abnormal profits to recommendation revisions using some of these alternative definitions. Results vary from 
definition to definition but are, in general, qualitatively similar to those presented later in the paper. 
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C. Stock Prices, Returns and Supplementary Information 
Stock prices (adjusted and unadjusted), returns, market values, and complementary information are 
collected from Datastream. We also collect earnings announcement date information for a series of 
robustness analyses from the Swedish House of Finance FINBAS database. These data are matched to the 
trade data from the Stockholm Stock Exchange using securities’ ISIN codes. The matching to IBES 
recommendations is subsequently done using IBES tickers and company names (each match is manually 
checked). Where a company has more than one share class traded in the exchange, the matching is to the 
most broadly traded security (typically B shares), as identified in the trade data. This is typically the only 
security for which there is Datastream information available, and is usually identified by IBES as the 
recommended security. After matching all three data sets we are left with 2,507 upgrades and 1,730 
downgrades across 270 firms (representing 45% of the 606 firms listed in the SSE at some point during our 
sample period, and 91% of the 296 firms with recommendation information). Table 2 reports features of 
these revisions, which tend to be concentrated among the largest most liquid firms. 
III. Methodology and Results 
We split our analysis in four parts. First, in Section III.A, we examine broker trading activity around 
recommendation revision dates. Second, in Sections III.B and III.C, we make use of broker clients’ 
positions on recommended stocks to estimate the profits obtained from trading on recommendations. We 
do this for our entire sample of recommendations as well as for a number of subsamples defined based on 
the proximity of recommendations to other recommendations and to earnings announcement dates. Third, 
in Section III.D we estimate the abnormal trading volumes and commission rates associated with 
recommendations. Finally, in Section III.E, we build on the previous results to estimate the abnormal 
commission income generated by recommending brokers from their recommendations and compare this 
with the abnormal profits made by the clients who follow them. 
A. Trading by Brokers’ Clients around Recommendation Revision Dates 
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To measure abnormal directional trading we establish a benchmark of normal trading. We do so by 
using the fact that market clearing implies that, unconditionally, expected net buying for any broker, stock, 
and time equals zero.4 For each broker b, stock i and day t, net buying (NB) is defined as follows, 
(1)  𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏.𝑖𝑖.𝑡𝑡 − 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ,             
where Bb,i,t and Sb,i,t are the values of purchases and sales of stock i executed by broker b at day t. 
Conditioning net buying activity on recommendation releases, we hypothesize that, around such 
releases, net buying will not be zero, i.e., 
(2)  𝐸𝐸(𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�𝐼𝐼𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏� ≠ 0     ∀𝑡𝑡 ∈ [𝜏𝜏; 𝜏𝜏 + 𝛿𝛿], 
where Ib,i,τ denotes both the recommendation and the information conveyed with it, τ is the recommendation 
release day, and δ is the length of the period during which the recommendation affects trading. In common 
with other studies, we do not know in advance the length of the window in which broker information affects 
trading, i.e. δ, or whether tips, information leakages, or imprecise dating results in recommendation-
motivated trading prior to the official recommendation release, but since in the absence of broker-specific 
information expected net buying is zero, we can use the data to infer when abnormal activity, and the 
recommendation information that motivates it, starts and finishes. 
Figure 1, which builds on this idea, shows the sample average of cumulative net buying in event 
time, beginning 20 days before the recorded recommendation date and ending 20 days after it. The solid 
black line in Panels A and B depicts the average cumulative net position of the recommending brokers’ 
clients around positive recommendation revision dates for big (decile one) and small (deciles two to ten) 
firms, respectively. During the first two weeks of the window, days τ − 20 to τ − 10, it shows no noticeable 
sign of recommending brokers’ clients taking a position in the recommended stock. From day τ − 10 on, 
net buying starts to diverge from zero in the direction implied by the recommendation.  By the end of the 
                                                 
4 Particular groups of brokers could sustain non-zero levels of net buying for some stocks and time periods, so later 
on we test whether this condition holds for recommending brokers and recommended stocks, outside recommendation 
periods. 
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window, cumulative net buying amounts to SEK 25 million (SEK 47 million for big recommended firms 
and SEK 7 million for small ones) per recommendation. Since aggregate positions must sum to zero, we 
know that the rest of the brokers on the market, on average, must be net selling the recommended stock.5  
To make sure that we are not simply capturing clientele effects we form two additional groups of 
brokers for comparison with our recommending group. We label brokers that cover the same stock as the 
recommending broker, but with no current recommendation revision in the analyzed window, as “informed” 
(on that stock), and brokers with no research coverage of the recommended stock as “uninformed” (on that 
stock).6 This classification implies that at a given point in time some brokers with research coverage of a 
given stock will be recommending brokers for that stock (if they have issued a new recommendation in the 
stock in a +/-20-day window of that day) and the others informed brokers (if they have not), but at other 
points in time the roles will reverse. Informed and recommending brokers are therefore the same brokers 
carrying different labels at different points in time. As a result, informed brokers are an ideal control group 
for recommending brokers. The uninformed broker category, on the other hand, includes full service 
brokers who do not cover the specific stock, regular brokers without local research departments, and 
discount (online) brokers, which cater to potentially different investor clienteles. 
The dashed line in Figure 1 depicts the average cumulative net position of the clients of informed 
brokers (total informed brokers’ clients net purchases divided by the number of recommendations). The 
clients of informed brokers maintain a fluctuating and slightly positive net position during much of the 
                                                 
5 Although net buying continues until day τ + 20 following an upgrade, large trades are tightly focused around the 
recorded recommendation date. If we segment trades into those above SEK 100,000 (some USD 12,500 during our 
sample period) and those below, we find that those above the threshold spike sharply in the +/-5-day window, while 
those below show no such pronounced pattern (see Internet Appendix). This points to the spike in recommendation-
motivated trading likely reflecting institutional, rather than retail, investors. 
6 The coverage period is assumed to begin two months before the first recommendation released in our dataset and 
ending twelve months after the final observation. 
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window, but unlike those of recommending brokers do not seem to increase it in the neighborhood of the 
recommendation release date. These results suggest that the net buying activity we observe through 
recommending brokers is related to their customers having specific knowledge of the information contained 
in the stock recommendation rather than being the result of clientele effects. Figure 1 also shows that it is 
mainly the investors trading through uninformed brokers who sell their stocks to investors trading through 
the recommending brokers. 
Panels C and D show the sample average of cumulative net buying around downgrades. The overall 
pattern is similar to that already described for upgrades, with only minor differences. The average aggregate 
position taken by the clients of recommending brokers is considerably smaller than for upgrades. 
Cumulative net selling by the end of the window is around SEK 17 million (31 million for big recommended 
firms and SEK 6 million for small ones). Most of the build-up of total net positions at the end of the window 
occurs in the five days prior to the recommendation release date. As with upgrades, we do not observe 
informed brokers’ clients’ net purchases reacting to recommendations. 
In order to explore the statistical significance of these findings we employ a regression approach 
across event periods. We estimate two separate OLS regressions of net purchases (NB) on indicator 
variables, one per event period–broker type pair, 
(3) 𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑤𝑤 = ∑ ∑ 𝐷𝐷𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶,𝑤𝑤 + 𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑤𝑤4𝑤𝑤=−4𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶                 𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐 = (𝑏𝑏𝑅𝑅 ,𝑏𝑏𝐼𝐼 ,𝑏𝑏𝑈𝑈), 
where we have aggregated net purchases over week-long periods, w, defined relative to recommendation 
dates τ, and 𝐷𝐷𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶,𝑤𝑤 are indicator variables that take the value 1 if net buying is measured in period w and the 
broker executing the trades belong to the bC category (recommending (bR), informed (bI), or uninformed 
(bU )), and 0 otherwise. Regressions are conducted separately for upgrades and downgrades. 
The results of performing these estimations are presented in Table 3. We obtain eight regression 
coefficients for each of the three broker categories (recommending, informed, and uninformed) and 
recommendation types. The coefficients correspond to the sample means of net purchases executed by the 
clients of recommending, informed, and uninformed brokers in the recommended stock in each period, 
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expressed in millions of Swedish kronor (SEK). The regression specification allows us to calculate standard 
errors clustered at the broker level. In this way we allow for a completely arbitrary correlation structure 
within each broker firm across recommendations and event time. The regression results confirm that 
recommending broker net purchases from upgrades peak in the week-long period starting on the date these 
brokers release the recommendation (days τ to τ + 5), but they are also significantly different from zero one 
week prior to this event (days τ − 5 to τ − 1). On average, recommending brokers’ net buying is SEK 7.1 
million in the (τ to τ + 5) period and is about half that size but still significantly positive in the following 
three week-long periods after the event. SEK 5.7 million of the build-up in the total position occurs in the 
week prior to the recommendation date. By comparison, recommending brokers’ net buying outside the 
recommendation windows (shown at the bottom of the table), a period during which we class them as 
informed brokers, is economically and statistically insignificant, at only SEK 0.02 million per week. 
Informed brokers’ net purchases do not follow the same pattern as recommending brokers’ net purchases 
during recommending brokers’ recommendation window, as revealed by the insignificant coefficients for 
this group during the weekly periods surrounding the revision date. For downgrades, negative net purchases 
for the recommending broker are largest in the five-day period prior to the issuance of the recommendation 
revision. Recommending brokers’ clients take a negative position of SEK 7.2 million in this period, which 
represents about half of the cumulative position at the end of the window. The clients of informed brokers 
generally take insignificant positions during this period. 
In the Internet Appendix we report separate results for recommendations issued in the 
neighborhood of an earnings announcement (+/-5-day window around the announcement date), a period in 
which substantial information about the firm is typically produced and disseminated (in addition to the 
information produced and disseminated by the analyst), and recommendations issued outside this window. 
Our analysis shows that recommending brokers’ clients respond to recommendation revisions in both 
subsamples, and that the response is qualitatively similar, with positive net purchases following but also 
immediately preceding recommendation upgrades and negative net purchases following and preceding 
downgrades. We also report the results of an additional falsification test in which we create a number of 
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placebo recommendation upgrades (downgrades), on the day of maximum (minimum) return for a stock in 
the 12-month period centered on the day a broker has issued a recommendation on the stock, but outside 
its +/-20-day recommendation window. We find no significant reaction following or preceding these 
placebo recommendations. 
All in all, our findings reveal that recommending brokers execute an abnormally large number of 
transactions in the direction of the recommendation, even prior to the recommendation release date. This 
indicates that recommendations not only have a substantial following among investors (see Irvine (2000) 
and Niehaus and Zhang (2010)), but also that some investors are likely informed about the content of the 
recommendations before the recorded recommendation revision date, and most importantly that they act on 
that information. These results, which are broadly consistent with those of Irvine et al. (2007), Juergens and 
Lindsey (2009) and Christophe et al. (2010), provide additional evidence of the severity of the 
recommendation misdating problem, whichever its cause (tips, leaks, or postdating of recommendations), 
and of the problems of assuming that investors can only act on recommendations starting on the recorded 
recommendation date. Our findings also indicate that brokers’ clients tend to take larger positions when the 
recommendation is for a big firm, reflecting the fact that these are the firms whose shares are typically more 
liquid and have greater market depth. 
B. Abnormal Profits 
We define abnormal profits (Π) as the product of trades in the recommended stock executed by the 
recommending broker and the abnormal return obtained on those trades. Formally, for trades executed by 
broker b, on stock i, on any given day t: 
(4)  Π𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = [𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡:𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 − 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡:𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 ], 
where Bb,i,t is the amount the clients of the broker issuing the recommendation purchased in the 
recommended stock measured in SEK, Sb,i,t is the amount the clients of the broker issuing the 
recommendation sold in the recommended stock, 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡:𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵  is a broker-specific abnormal return for 
purchases, and 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡:𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆 is a broker-specific abnormal return for sales. Broker-specific abnormal returns are 
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computed from broker-specific, quantity weighted, average transaction prices and measure the normalized 
change in price from t, the day on which the transactions take place, to T, some post-event day on which 
the profitability of the position is measured. Formally, 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡:𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 = 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇−𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 − 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀−𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 , where 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵  is the 
volume-weighted average price paid by the clients of broker b for purchases of the stock of firm i at time t, 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇  is the closing price of firm i at a reference date T, and PM is the price of a pre-defined market 
benchmark.7 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡:𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆 is similarly defined. Profits are thus calculated in excess of what could have been 
obtained by investing in the market benchmark. 
An attractive feature of this measure is that it is relatively insensitive to noisy dating of clients’ 
access to recommendations. In computing it, we include all transactions executed by the recommending 
broker’s clients within a window around the recorded date of the recommendation change. As long as the 
window is wide enough to include all recommendation- motivated trades, the abnormal profits measure 
will be unaffected by imprecision about the date on which clients access recommendations. Some trades 
that pass through the recommending broker may not be recommendation-motivated (responding instead to 
life cycle or liquidity needs, or even to information not generated by the broker or its analysts), but to the 
extent that transactions unrelated to recommendations are on average as likely to outperform as the non-
recommendation related transactions passing through other brokers in the exchange, their contribution to 
recommending brokers’ abnormal profits should cancel out. This would be the case if the matching of 
clients and brokers is not significantly correlated with client information or trading skill. Results presented 
later in the paper suggest that this is indeed a reasonable assumption. 
Trade-based abnormal profits are free from investability problems. This is because they are 
calculated using the prices the clients were able to trade at (instead of closing prices) and the quantities they 
were able to transact at those prices (instead of assuming constant levels of investability or market depth, 
or proportionality to market capitalization). As a result, abnormal profits reflect the actual aggregate excess 
                                                 
7 All prices are adjusted for dividends and splits. 
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profits made by the clients of recommending brokers net of the impact of bid-ask spreads, the price impact 
of trading, and other trading frictions. 
Abnormal profits are also unaffected by confounding contemporaneous public signals. If 
recommendations merely reproduce public announcements (e.g., earnings announcements) their value may 
prove limited, even if measured abnormal returns (the abnormal returns to public news) are significant. In 
efficient markets, public news should not confer an advantage to any particular group of investors. As a 
result, trades directly or indirectly triggered by public news should not be particularly profitable. Notice, 
however, that if there are inefficiencies related to public announcements, and analysts help their clients 
exploit them, their profits will naturally be included in this measure of value added. 
Finally, recommendations typically contain more information than what can be conveyed by the 
standard categories of Buy, Hold and Sell, and the extra information might be exploited by investors in 
their trading strategies (see, e.g., Asquith, Mikhail, and Au (2005), Huang, Zang, and Zheng (2014)). The 
value of that extra information, to the extent it is exploited by investors in their trading strategies, will be 
reflected in abnormal profits. 
Figure 2 shows cumulative abnormal profits, as well as returns, in event time, for transactions from 
20 trading days before the broker releases an upgrade (downgrade) until 20 trading days afterwards. 
Cumulative abnormal profits measure the cumulative profitability of all transactions carried out by the 
recommending broker’s clients in the chosen window. For each transaction, abnormal profits are measured 
as the difference between the price paid (obtained) for the stock when it was acquired (sold), at day t, and 
the market price for that stock one month after the recommendation revision date (the reference date, T). 
Abnormal profits are computed in excess of the profits that could have been obtained by investing the same 
amount of money in the value-weighted Swedish SIX index. Cumulative abnormal returns are defined in 
the traditional way, and measure the return that can be obtained by investing in the recommendation at the 
beginning of the window in excess of what could have been obtained by investing in the value-weighted 
Swedish SIX index. Returns and profits thus measured are short-term, and they could in principle increase 
or decrease if measured at longer horizons. 
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In common with most of the literature, Figure 2 shows positive abnormal returns following (and 
preceding) recommendation upgrades, and negative abnormal returns following (and preceding) 
downgrades. In the 40-day window shown, abnormal returns to upgrades equal 4.0%, and those to 
downgrades -1.6%. Most of these abnormal returns, however, occur in the pre-recommendation window, 
with only a small fraction occurring in the post-event period. A conservative estimate of the performance 
of recommendations would ignore pre-event returns, but given the evidence of brokers’ clients building 
positions consistent with those brokers’ recommendations several days before the recommendation release, 
it is natural to believe that at least part of those abnormal returns can be captured by investors who follow 
financial analysts’ advice.  
The solid black line in Figure 2, which measures the aggregate cumulative profitability of all 
transactions carried out by the clients of recommending brokers in a 20-day window around the 
recommendation date, takes the analysis a step further. By documenting the existence of broker-specific 
abnormal profits on days immediately preceding and following positive recommendation announcements 
it reveals that brokers’ clients possess an informational advantage at that point and make use of it.8 This 
goes beyond what could be inferred just by looking at abnormal returns.  Altogether, recommending brokers’ 
clients make an average of SEK 514,300 per upgrade. These abnormal profits are concentrated around the 
dates on which the analysts are recorded as releasing upgrades and are matched by negative profits obtained 
                                                 
8 An alternative interpretation is that, rather than conveying information to their clients by their recommendations, 
analysts extract information from clients trades in forming their recommendations. This reverse causality explanation 
seems unlikely (although it cannot be completely ruled out). An analysis of commission data in the Internet Appendix 
reveals that recommending brokers’ commission rates are high in the pre-revision period. Since commission discounts 
are typically not provided on trades related to recommendations, this would be consistent with revisions driving the 
(undiscounted) trades in the pre-recommendation window, rather than vice versa. Notice also that, in a pure limit order 
book, order flow is public information available to any analyst or trader in the market, and unlikely to confer an 
informational advantage on the analysts of a particular firm. 
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by the rest of the brokers (the abnormal profits measure we use here is indeed a zero-sum measure; this 
means that any positive profits for a broker have to be exactly balanced by negative profits for another). 
Roughly half of those profits are associated with transactions that take place before the recorded date of the 
upgrade. The same is not true of downgrades, for which brokers do not appear to execute profitable 
transactions for their clients. 
In order to allow for overlapping recommendation windows in our statistical analysis, we study 
abnormal profits associated with recommendations in calendar time. For this we build two portfolios, an 
“upgrade” and a “downgrade” portfolio, using recommending brokers’ clients’ daily trades around 
recommendation revision dates. Purchases and sales of each stock and the gains or losses associated with 
those positions are kept in these portfolios until T = 20 trading days (about a month) after the recorded 
release date of the recommendation. In the calculations of these profits we use actual transaction prices, 
rather than closing prices, as we describe in the Appendix, and we also experiment with longer and shorter 
valuation horizons (trying to capture longer- and shorter-term profits). 
We report aggregate daily abnormal profits calculated using this procedure in Table 4. These profits 
are computed using all trades channeled through the recommending brokers over three different windows, 
+/-5-day, +/-10-day, and +/-20-day, around recommendation revision dates and represent an aggregate daily 
profit from all the recommendations in our sample. Daily abnormal profits obtained by the clients of 
recommending brokers are estimated to be between SEK 466,971 and SEK 535,652, depending on the 
window used for measurement, in our sample of recommendations.9 Table 4 also presents average abnormal 
profits per recommendation for the three recommendation windows. We calculate per-recommendation 
abnormal profits by aggregating daily abnormal profits over the entire sample period (about 9.5 years or 
2,388 trading days for the broadest window) and dividing that number by the number of recommendation 
                                                 
9 Abnormal profits computed using closing prices are, on average, between 7% and 11% (SEK 32,726 to SEK 58,073) 
lower than the profits obtained when using actual transaction prices. This is due to investors channeling their trades 
through recommending brokers trading at prices that are, on average, better than closing prices.  
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revisions that generated them. The resulting per window, per recommendation abnormal profits vary 
between SEK 442,011, for the +/-5-day window, and SEK 510,652, for the +/-20-day window. 
These results suggest that profits are mostly concentrated on a narrow (+/-5-day) window around 
the recommendation date, as expanding the window to include four times as many days (+/-20-day window) 
barely has an impact on total daily or per recommendation profits. Note that, within a given calendar day, 
daily profits from several recommendations are aggregated, rather than averaged, so widening the window 
to include additional window-days in which profits are zero results in the same aggregate daily profits, or 
slightly larger (smaller) ones if the additional window-days include marginally profitable (unprofitable) 
transactions.10 This is reasonable, as recommendations tend to be more valuable, and trades based on them 
more profitable, at the moment of their release or shortly after it, but their value quickly dissipates as 
investors act on them and their information gets impounded into prices. Expanding the window therefore 
tends to result in additional non-event days that dilute the statistical significance without significantly 
affecting the estimate. Moreover, the fact that abnormal profits are virtually zero outside the narrower 
recommendation window supports the assumption that the abnormal profits are attributable to 
recommendations; it also suggests that the results we document cannot be attributed to recommending 
brokers’ clients being consistently better informed than other brokers’ clients. As shown in the Internet 
Appendix, these results are not only statistically and economically significant, but they are also robust to 
changes in the time horizon at which positions are valued: two weeks, one month or two months after the 
                                                 
10 When looking at profits in the +/-5-day window, the (upgrade and downgrade) portfolios include only positions 
taken within this narrow window. But when looking at one of the wider windows, the (upgrade and downgrade) 
portfolios include positions taken within the +/-5 window, but also positions taken in the wider window that are not 
part of the narrower +/-5 window. To the extent that these additional positions (taken outside the narrow +/-5 window) 
are not systematically profitable, profits for upgrades do not increase or vary monotonically between the +/- 5 and +/- 
20 day windows in Table 4. 
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recommendation release date, and to the inclusion or removal of recommendation initiations from the 
sample.11  
The profits to clients of recommending brokers are matched by trading losses made by clients of 
the other brokers active in the market. Table 5, which offers a contrast between abnormal profits per 
recommendation obtained by the clients of recommending, informed, and uninformed brokers, shows that 
the clients of informed brokers do not execute profitable transactions during the recommendation window. 
Given that informed brokers are essentially recommending brokers who have not issued a contemporaneous 
recommendation on the stock in question, this observation provides further evidence that the abnormal 
profits we identify are most likely related to analysts’ recommendations and not just the result of existing 
differences in broker clients’ ability or information.12  
Tables 4 and 5 also reveal that recommending brokers’ clients’ pre-recommendation profits, 
defined as those associated with transactions that take place before the reported recommendation date, are 
positive and significant (when we look at narrow windows) and amount to almost half of the total 
recommendation profits. Pre- and post-recommendation profits are computed by narrowing the trading 
window to (τ − δ; τ − 1) and (τ; τ + δ), respectively, but always keeping the reference horizon fixed (T = 
20). This provides evidence of profitable activity taking place before the recorded recommendation date. 
This finding, coupled with evidence that both the net trades and market shares of recommending brokers’ 
clients increase prior to the release of recommendations, is consistent with the evidence about pre-record 
                                                 
11  This is especially true for abnormal profits to trades executed in the +/-5-day window, where most of the 
recommendation motivated trading is concentrated. 
12 In particular this shows that our results are not driven by a particular group of clients. For instance, institutional 
clients may be more likely to trade through large brokerage houses with research departments. These clients may also 
have an informational advantage, compared to individuals, which is unrelated to recommendations (see, for example, 
Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2009)). Yet, since they are equally likely to trade through recommending or informed 
brokers (being the same brokers) they cannot be driving the reported results. 
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date access to recommendations (Womack (1996), Irvine et al. (2007), Christophe et al. (2010) and Hoechle 
et al. (2015)). It suggests that ignoring activity in the pre-recommendation window can be misleading and 
result in severe underestimation of recommendations’ profitability (in our case roughly half of the profits 
dissipate if we omit the pre-recommendation window). 
Most of the profits we identify are obtained by trading in the shares of relatively large firms. More 
than 80% of the documented abnormal profits come from trades on revisions in firms ranked in the first 
decile of the size distribution, with the rest coming from trading in firms classified in deciles 2 to 10, even 
though less than half of the recommendations are issued on decile 1 firms. This is despite the finding that 
stock prices increase more following upgrades, and decline more following downgrades, for small firms 
than for large firms (5.42% vs. 2.29% for upgrades and -1.97% vs. -0.93% for downgrades). Smaller stocks 
have larger price responses, but they also typically have larger transactions costs, and there is usually not 
much room to trade in them, as revealed by the minimal cumulative net purchases (sales) observed at the 
end of their recommendation windows. 
The results for downgrades in the same tables suggest either that negative revisions do not contain 
valuable information or that investors fail to capitalize on them. This may seem surprising given the 
evidence of substantial selling activity around these recommendations coupled with negative average 
abnormal returns. Most of those returns, however, are pre-recommendation returns and they may not be 
exploitable by investors. 
C. Earnings Announcements, Recommendation Clustering, and Abnormal Profits 
We next analyze the profitability of stock recommendations issued immediately around earnings 
announcement dates (EADs) or other recommendations and those issued further away from them. This 
allows us to investigate the value added by recommendations in what are likely to be different types of 
information environments. Recommendation revisions issued in the proximity of earnings announcements 
or other recommendation changes (clustered recommendations), a situation which is more likely if 
recommendation changes are a response to public news, typically face more competition from information 
and analysis issued by other analysts and sources. By contrast, more isolated revisions, issued away from 
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earnings announcement dates and/or other recommendations face less (or no) competition from alternative 
sources, including other recommendation changes. 
For this purpose, we sort recommendation revisions into those that take place within a +/-5-day 
window around earnings announcement dates and those revisions that take place outside of that window. 
At the same time, we sort recommendations into two groups using four different definitions of clustering. 
According to the first definition of clustering, we classify recommendation revisions as isolated if there is 
no other recommendation in the window of τ − 5 to τ + 5 days, and clustered otherwise. While this is a 
clean definition of isolation, it results in a measure that is highly correlated with firm size. The average 
recommended firm size decile of isolated recommendation upgrades (downgrades) is 2.6 (2.7) whereas the 
average recommended firm size decile of clustered recommendation upgrades (downgrades) is 1.6 (1.8). 
To address this problem we also work with three other definitions. The second definition of clustering splits 
recommendation revisions into two groups depending on the time to the nearest recommendation, whether 
before or after. Those recommendations for which the time is shortest (longest) are clustered (isolated). The 
third definition splits recommendation revisions into two groups based on the time from the previous 
recommendation only. Finally, we split recommendation revisions according to the density of the cluster, 
that is, we create categories of relatively isolated and relatively clustered recommendations based on the 
number of other recommendations included in a +/-20-day window centered on the recommendation release 
date. Under the last three definitions of clustering, we sort for each firm-year pair and separately for 
upgrades and downgrades to avoid ending up with two groups of firms whose main difference is firm size 
or analyst following. With these sorting criteria smaller firms are still more prevalent in the isolated group 
but this is because of ties and uneven numbers of recommendations in the sorting groups (single 
recommendation revisions for a firm-year, typically belonging to relatively small firms, are always assigned 
to the isolated group).13  
                                                 
13 The formula for sorting observations into the clustered (0) or isolated (1) groups is: FLOOR(rank*2/(N+1)), where 
FLOOR is the FLOOR function, rank is the observation’s order rank, and N is the number of observations having non-
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Panel A of Table 6 shows that upgrades issued in the proximity of earnings announcements as well 
as those issued outside the EAD window are profitable. Abnormal profits are higher for upgrades issued 
close to earnings announcement dates than away from them, but differences are not statistically significant. 
Earnings announcements convey unprocessed information, and if equity analysts are helpful in interpreting 
the content of this information, as our analysis suggests, we should expect positions built up by the clients 
of recommending brokers around these days (and not just away from them) to be profitable. Panel B of this 
table shows that upgrades are also profitable regardless of whether they are issued close to other 
recommendations or not (using almost any definition of clustering). Abnormal profits to recommendation 
downgrades, on the other hand, are never statistically different from zero. They tend to be markedly 
negative for clustered downgrades or for downgrades issued close to earnings announcement dates, and 
positive but small for isolated downgrades even though negative abnormal returns are twice as large for 
clustered downgrades as for isolated downgrades under all four definitions, as shown in the Internet 
Appendix. 
The results in this section suggest that recommendation upgrades are valuable to the clients of 
recommending brokers even in markedly different information environments, that is, those in which there 
is more competition from other recommendations and sources of information and those in which there is 
less or none at all. They also indicate that none of these potentially confounding events (announcements 
and competing recommendations), have a significant impact on our results. Abnormal profits to 
recommendation upgrades are (marginally) higher or lower in one or another situation but differences are 
never large or statistically different from zero. 
These results also hint at a possible explanation for the low level of abnormal profits related to 
downgrades. Low abnormal profits are concentrated around clustered downgrades. If anything, these 
downgrades are also associated with larger negative abnormal returns (measured over the entire event 
                                                 
missing values of the ranking variable. If there are ties all tied observations are ranked in the same group depending 
on the mean rank of the observation. 
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window). To the extent that clustered recommendation revisions are more likely than isolated 
recommendations to be a response to public news, this is consistent with downgrades frequently being 
responses to prices which have already fallen and which investors cannot therefore exploit as profitably as 
they can upgrades. In other words, many recommendation downgrades may simply be responding to price 
movements (analysts responding to large price drops, and realigning their optimal level of optimism and 
accuracy accordingly, as argued by Conrad, Cornell, Landsman, and Rountree (2006)), rather than leading 
them. 
D. Trading Volume and Commission Rates around Recommendation Dates 
One justification for the provision of stock analysis is that it generates greater commission income 
for brokers. In this section we estimate the value of abnormal trading volume attributable to 
recommendation revisions and we examine (institutional) commission rates for recommending brokers 
around recommendation dates. This will allow us, in the next section, to compare the abnormal commission 
income made by recommending brokers around recommendation dates with the abnormal profits made by 
their clients in the same period. 
We estimate the value of abnormal buy volume using the following model for each broker-stock-
year triplet, b, i, y: 
(5)  𝐵𝐵𝑉𝑉𝑏𝑏𝑅𝑅,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝑏𝑏𝑅𝑅,𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦0 + 𝛽𝛽𝑏𝑏𝑅𝑅,𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦1 𝐵𝐵𝑉𝑉𝑏𝑏𝑈𝑈,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑏𝑏𝑅𝑅,𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦2 𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑏𝑏𝑅𝑅,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑏𝑏𝑅𝑅,𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦3 𝐵𝐵𝑉𝑉𝑏𝑏𝑈𝑈,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑏𝑏𝑅𝑅,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑏𝑏𝑅𝑅,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , 
where 𝐵𝐵𝑉𝑉𝑏𝑏𝑅𝑅,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the buy-side SEK volume of recommending broker bR on stock i and day t; 𝐵𝐵𝑉𝑉𝑏𝑏𝑈𝑈,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the 
aggregate buy-side SEK volume of uninformed brokers on stock i and day t; and 𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑏𝑏𝑅𝑅,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is a dummy 
variable equal to one if broker bR issued an upgrade on firm i less than 20 days away from t and zero 
otherwise. We use  𝛽𝛽𝑏𝑏𝑅𝑅,𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦2 + 𝛽𝛽𝑏𝑏𝑅𝑅,𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦3 𝐵𝐵𝑉𝑉𝑏𝑏𝑈𝑈,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑏𝑏𝑅𝑅,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, the difference between total observed buy volume and 
the estimated normal amount of buy volume, as our estimate of the abnormal amount of purchases executed 
by the recommending broker bR on firm i on each day t in the upgrade recommendation window. We use 
an identical set of regressions to estimate the abnormal value of sales for downgrades. By including the buy 
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(sell) side trading volumes of non-recommending institutional brokers, we control in a parsimonious way 
for sources of common variation (public information) in trading.14 
Table 7 shows recommending brokers’ estimated abnormal trading volume in the recommended 
stock around recommendation revision dates. Results in this table suggest that recommendation revisions 
are associated with a significant increase in trading among broker clients. The average cumulative abnormal 
trading volume per recommendation 20 trading days after a recommendation release is SEK 56 million. 
Most of the effect of the recommendation revision on trading volume occurs within a narrow timeframe. 
For upgrades (downgrades), 74% (73%) of the abnormal trading volumes we find in the +/-20-day window 
is already present in the narrower +/-5-day window. Consistent with other studies (see e.g., Irvine (2004) 
and Jackson (2005)) the estimate for cumulative abnormal sell volume around downgrades is much smaller 
(SEK 24 million at the end of day τ + 20).15 
For 2002 to June 2006 (the latter part of our sample period) we examine the rates of institutional 
commissions charged by brokers around recommendation dates. We do so by using transaction data from 
Abel Noser, a firm specializing in trading cost analysis, and matching it against data from our sample.16 
                                                 
14  The logic behind this procedure is that if trading volume on a given stock is larger for reasons other than 
recommendations, then it will be larger not only for recommending brokers but also for uninformed (non-
recommending) ones. For comparison, in the Internet Appendix we include a table showing abnormal volumes 
computed as the difference between the observed buy (sell) volume and the normal level of buy (sell) volume on days 
away from the recommendation window (i.e., without controlling for common variation in trading). Results obtained 
using this procedure are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 7 below. 
15 This has been generally attributed to individuals’ reticence to short sell stocks. We find further support for this by 
comparing differences in abnormal trading volumes for small firms, which are typically especially difficult to short 
sell. While recommendation upgrades, for large and small firms, are associated with significant increases in 
recommending broker trading volumes, downgrades of small firms do not seem to lead to more sell volume in the 
downgraded stock. 
16 See Puckett and Yan (2011) for a detailed description of the Abel Noser/ANcerno data set. 
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The Abel Noser data set contains information on 250,291 trades in the SSE, of which 85,803 (39,397 sales 
and 46,406 purchases) have broker identifiers. Data before 2002 were not available. 
These trades are matched to 1,559 recommendation revisions (out of 2,991 revisions in our sample 
during this period) issued by 16 different brokers for 52 of the 205 firms in our data set. An analysis, 
included in the Internet Appendix, of the distribution of trades across firms in different size deciles in the 
full SSE sample and the Abel Noser sample reveals that trades in larger firms are marginally 
overrepresented in the Abel Noser sample. A comparison of the top brokers and their market shares in both 
samples (again in the Internet Appendix) also reveals a higher prevalence of trades by foreign brokers in 
the Abel Noser sample than in the full SSE sample. The commissions estimated are therefore likely to be 
representative of what institutions paid for their transactions in medium to large firms (the most frequently 
recommended firms), which may yield a conservative estimate of the overall commission rate in the market. 
Commissions in Sweden are paid as a fraction of transaction value. Brokers usually work with price 
lists and institutional customers negotiate discounts on trades.17 We compare brokerage commissions paid 
to recommending brokers on recommended stocks around recommendation dates with commissions paid 
to those brokers in general. The modal commission in both cases is 20 bp, which is towards the upper end 
of the range of commissions. However, while this mode of 20 bp applies to just over 20% of transactions 
in general, it applies to 56% of transactions in the +/-5-day period around recommendation changes. This 
is consistent with reports by industry sources suggesting that brokers typically do not discount trades if 
initiated by a broker recommendation. 
In line with this interpretation, and with results in Goldstein, Irvine, Kandel, and Wiener (2009), 
we also find that (institutional) commission rates paid to recommending brokers around recommendation 
revision dates are larger than those paid to other brokers. In our +/-5-day window around recommendation 
                                                 
17 By contrast, retail clients generally pay fixed rather than negotiable fees, and are less likely to shop their broking 
business among different brokers. 
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dates the average commission rates paid to the former are 16.4 basis points (bp) and to the latter 13.5 bp 
(12.5 bp if we include brokers not issuing recommendations at all).18  
Our data also reveal interesting patterns within the commission rates of recommending brokers 
themselves. In Panel A of Table 8 use the same 2002–2006 data set to explore commission rates for 
purchases executed around upgrades and sales executed around downgrades. The baseline in this case is 
the average commission rates for all purchases and sales in recommended stocks during our entire sample 
period: 13.7 bp and 13.6 bp, respectively. If we look at commissions paid on transactions in recommended 
firms’ shares during our three windows, we find that average commission rates on downgraded stocks 
barely change (they are between 14.0 bp and 14.4 bp depending on the window), while those on upgraded 
stocks rise as the window narrows, increasing to 17.6 bp in the +/-5-day window, with the difference 
between all commission rates and commission rates in this window significant at the 2% level. 
In the Internet Appendix we offer a more detailed analysis of these commission rates. In particular, 
we show that recommending broker commission rates in the +/-5-day window of recommendation upgrades 
are also significantly higher than those charged by informed and uninformed brokers in the same period. 
We also break down the recommending broker commissions on recommended stocks into the periods 
before and after a recommendation change. The average commission rates before the recommendation date 
are significantly higher than those after the recommendation date, likely because customers are willing to 
pay more for early access to recommendations. They also rise steadily as the window used in the analysis 
narrows, reflecting the fact that most recommendation-motivated trades are tightly concentrated around the 
recommendation release date. The average rates after the recommendation date are not only smaller but 
also show no consistent pattern. In that analysis we also include further controls for trade size, firm size, 
and broker fixed effects, as well as an ex-post measure of recommendation profitability, with no significant 
                                                 
18 This only partly reflects the fact that recommending brokers are full-service brokers, whereas some of the other 
brokers provide a cheaper, execution-only, service. Across our data set as a whole, the average commission for full-
service brokers and discount brokers are 14.5 bp and 11 bp, respectively. 
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impact on results. Overall, the patterns of commission rates identified match the pattern of profits made by 
clients following recommendations. Thus higher rates are paid for upgrades than for downgrades, and 
higher commissions are paid for trades before than after the recorded recommendation date. This is 
consistent with a framework in which brokers are rewarded more for recommendations which are more 
valuable for their clients. 
E. Comparing Clients’ Abnormal Profits with Brokers’ Abnormal Commission Income 
In the previous subsection we find abnormally large trading volumes and large commission rates 
for recommending brokers around recommendation dates. We now build on these results to estimate the 
abnormal commission income generated by recommending brokers from their recommendations and 
compare this with the abnormal profits made by the clients who follow them. 
Panel B of Table 8 shows average abnormal commission income generated per recommendation. 
We estimate this by using the estimated abnormal turnover per recommendation and the point estimates for 
round trip commissions paid for upgrades and downgrades within each respective window. We assume that 
recommending brokers’ clients paid the average commission rate in the relevant window to buy or sell 
shares and that liquidation was done at the average commission rate for the full sample. On this basis, the 
average abnormal commission income per recommendation change in either direction ranges from 
approximately SEK 120,000 in the +/-5-day window to approximately SEK 127,000 in the +/-10-day 
window. Estimated commission revenue per recommendation increases only marginally when going from 
the narrower +/-5-day window to the broader +/-20-day window, a reflection of the fact that 
recommendation-motivated trades, and therefore abnormal volume, are tightly concentrated around the 
recommendation release date. We also find that the abnormal commission income earned by brokers for 
large firms is over seven times that for small firms, e.g. approximately SEK 234,000 versus approximately 
SEK 32,000 in the +/-5-day window. Note that the greater abnormal commission income for upgrades and 
large firms matches the greater abnormal profits to clients for upgrades and large firms. Once again, 
abnormal commissions to brokers and abnormal profits to their clients vary in line. 
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In Panel C of Table 8 we make a direct comparison between the abnormal commission income 
generated by recommending brokers and the abnormal profits made by their clients. The percentages 
represent the ratio of the commission paid in Panel B of this table to the profits per recommendation implied 
by daily abnormal profits in Table 5. For upgrades, brokers generate commissions of around one-third of 
clients’ profits. For downgrades the percentage is 154% in the +/-5-day window and negative in the longer 
windows; this reflects the fact that clients make very low abnormal profits (+/-5-day) or losses (+/-10-day 
and +/-20-day windows) from downgrades (see Table 4). Taking all recommendation changes together, 
abnormal commissions vary between 42% of clients’ abnormal profits for the +/-5-day window and 57–
61% for the two longer windows. A breakdown between recommendations of large and small firms shows 
that the percentage ranges between around 40% and 66% in both categories.19  
The abnormal commissions we estimate are likely to understate the value added by stock analysts 
for three reasons. First, our sample reflects the commission rates of large institutional investors, which tend 
to be smaller than those of retail investors and small institutions. Second, financial analysts not only issue 
stock recommendations: they also produce other types of research such as earnings forecasts and industry 
analysis, which can also be a useful source of information for their clients which is rewarded by 
commissions. Third, research by Irvine (2000) and Madureira and Underwood (2008), among others, also 
suggests that investors reward research production by brokers on a much more general level. Brokerage 
houses’ research departments have historically provided services to other branches, such as retail sales, 
investment banking, and proprietary trading desks. Since we can only speculate about the magnitude of 
                                                 
19 In the Internet Appendix we present alternative estimates of abnormal commission revenues and of the fraction of 
total profits captured by brokers, based on a number of different model assumptions and sample periods. These show 
that the numbers presented in the paper are robust to alternative specifications. In particular, models for commission 
rates designed to offer alternative solutions to identified tilts in the commission data, have only a small impact on 
estimated revenues and profit splits. 
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trade-generation outside our sample of revisions, we simply emphasize that brokers seem to capture a 
considerable fraction of the measured trading profits generated by upgrades and downgrades. 
IV Summary and Conclusions 
In this study we benefit from a large and comprehensive dataset of brokers’ daily transactions, 
covering a period of almost 10 years. This enables us to explore trading behavior in response to privately 
observed recommendations, and to infer more precisely when and to what extent recommendations are used. 
We provide evidence that brokers’ clients tend to trade in the direction suggested by recommendations. 
Moreover, transactions executed by recommending brokers in recommended stocks around upgrades to buy 
or strong buy are on average profitable, showing that brokers’ clients actually benefit from the information 
contained in recommendations.  
A comparison between abnormal returns and abnormal profits highlights where abnormal returns 
can be most misleading as a measure of added value of recommendations. A sizeable part of the abnormal 
profits to upgrades is associated with trades executed before the recorded recommendation date. This, 
coupled with evidence that both recommending brokers’ net trades and market shares increase prior to the 
release of recommendations, is consistent with the evidence about pre-record date access to 
recommendations. Ignoring activity in the pre-recommendation window can result in a severe 
underestimation of recommendations’ profitability (in our case roughly half of the profits dissipate if we 
omit the pre-recommendation window). But including it without due care is also dangerous, as it is not 
always the case that investors are in possession of recommendation information at that point. Our results 
indicate that broker clients do not profit from downgrades to sell or strong sell. Their inability to do so 
cannot be accounted for by inaction on their part; rather the reason lies elsewhere, most likely in that these 
recommendation revisions do not contain exploitable information but simply piggyback on recent news. 
Moreover, we find that in contrast to abnormal returns, abnormal profits for both upgrades and downgrades 
of small caps are insignificant. These small profits reflect the size of positions taken in such stocks by 
investors, who are likely inhibited from taking larger positions by lack of investability and large transaction 
costs. 
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Estimating abnormal profits, as opposed to abnormal returns, allows us to compare the financial 
benefits experienced by the clients of recommending brokers with the abnormal commissions generated by 
those brokers. We find that brokers’ abnormal commissions are, at a lower bound, around 40% to 60% of 
clients’ abnormal profits per recommendation. In other words, a considerable fraction of abnormal profits 
flows back, through brokerage commissions, to recommending brokers. More than this, brokers’ 
commissions vary in line with their clients’ profits. When we measure the volume of transactions, we find 
that abnormal volumes are greater for (the more profitable) upgrades than for (the less profitable) 
downgrades. And when we measure commission rates (as opposed to volumes), we find that these also vary 
in line with clients’ profits: commission rates are larger for (the more profitable) upgrades than for (the less 
profitable) downgrades and they are larger just before recommendations (when the full value of the 
recommendation can be captured by clients) than afterwards (when only part of that value can be captured). 
In all, our findings for recommending brokers suggest a situation similar to the one which Berk and 
van Binsbergen (2015) identify for asset managers: the benefit of investment expertise is largely captured 
by those who possess it. 
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Appendix 
In this appendix we describe the calendar time portfolio approach used in the computation of daily 
abnormal profits. This approach relies in building two portfolios, an “upgrade” and a “downgrade” portfolio, 
using recommending brokers’ clients’ daily trades around the dates of these changes in recommendation. 
Each time a firm receives a recommendation that is both positive (buy or strong buy) and entails a 
positive change with respect to the previous recommendation, all trades executed by the recommending 
broker on the recommended stock in an δ-day window of the recommendation change are added to the 
upgrade portfolio on the date they were actually executed. Choosing a window centered on the 
recommendation date implies that transactions occurring before as well as after the recommendation date 
will be included in the corresponding portfolio. In this way we capture pre-recommendation leaks and avoid 
overestimating profits by considering investments only if the broker, on behalf of its clients, invested in the 
stock (or shorted it). 
Purchases and sales of each stock and the gains or losses associated with those positions are kept 
in the portfolio until T = 20 trading days after the recorded release date of the recommendation that 
motivated their inclusion in the portfolio, at which point all positions opened in relation with that 
recommendation are closed. This means that at the end of any given day t the upgrades portfolio will be 
invested in all stocks recommended in an δ-day window of that trading date and the amounts invested in 
each stock will be equal to the net trade on date t in that stock by all brokers who recommended it (in an δ-
day window of t) plus the net position in that stock at time t − 1 adjusted to reflect past returns. The portfolio 
therefore reflects how investors responded to the recommendations, without having to assume when or how 
much they traded. Keeping the horizon fixed, even when working with narrow trade windows, means that 
those trades are kept in the portfolio (plus/minus gains/loses) until a fixed date after the recommendation is 
released, facilitating comparisons between different windows. A relatively wide window also helps avoid 
the effect of price pressure in our measures. 
Formally, for each stock i and broker b, we calculate daily individual abnormal profits in the 
following way: 
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(A1)  𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 ∙ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , 
with 
𝜆𝜆𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, 
where CNBb,i,t−1 is broker b’s net position in stock i at the end of the previous (𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−2(1 +
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1), ARi,t is day t daily abnormal return on stock i computed from closing prices, 
and λb,i,t is an intraday adjustment that corrects for the fact that transactions may be carried out at prices 
other than closing prices (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵  is the difference between difference between stock’s i closing price 
on day t and the weighted average transaction price on that same stock for purchases (S, sales) by broker b 
on that same day). 
To obtain a time series of aggregate daily abnormal profits we sum individual abnormal profits 
across all recommended stocks in each calendar day. We then calculate average aggregate daily abnormal 
profits and assess their statistical significance using Newey-West standard errors (the abnormal profits 
series is stationary in the period analyzed). Abnormal profits per recommendation are obtained by 
multiplying average aggregate daily abnormal profits by the number of calendar days in our sample period 
(2,388 trading days for the broadest window) and dividing that number by the number of recommendation 
revisions that generated them. We follow the same procedure for downgraded stocks in the downgrade 
portfolio. 
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Table 1: Recommendation Transition Matrix 
This table displays the number of recommendation revisions in each of the 20 categories defined by the crossing of 
the current recommendation level with the prior recommendation level (excluding recommendation repetitions). 
Upgrades to buy or strong buy (left-hand side of the table) and downgrades to sell or strong sell (right-hand side of 
the table) appear in bold. Data from January 1997–June 2006. 
 
Strong Buy Buy Hold Sell Strong Sell
Strong Buy - 684 479 101 37
Buy 592 - 922 809 86
Hold 515 817 - 535 323
Sell 106 720 494 - 147
Strong Sell 36 97 302 140 -
Upgrades to 
Buy or Strong 
Buy, Total
Downgrades 
to Sell or 
Strong Sell, 
Total
2,883 2,038
Revised Recommendation
Pr
ev
io
us
 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
n
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Table 2: Sample Statistics 
This table shows the number of recommendation revisions (upgrades to buy or strong buy and downgrades to sell or strong sell) issued on firms in each firm-size 
decile. It also shows the average market capitalization and average annual value of shares traded ('Total Trading') in firms in each firm-size decile, expressed in 
billions of Swedish kronor). Market capitalization is measured at the end of 2005, whereas the value of shares traded is measured for the entire year 2005. In these 
two rows, the last column, labeled 'Total', shows total market capitalization and value of shares traded for the entire market in 2005. The last two rows in the table 
display the aggregate market share of brokerage firms which have analysts issuing recommendations on (i.e. covering) firms in each firm-size decile, measured by 
share volume and number of trades between January 1997 and June 2006.  
 
 
 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
# of recommendations 1,164 505 372 245 105 67 32 14 2 1 2,507
% of total 46.4% 20.1% 14.8% 9.8% 4.2% 2.7% 1.3% 0.6% 0.1% 0.0% 59.2%
# of recommendations 717 377 281 185 57 51 29 16 15 2 1,730
% of total 41.4% 21.8% 16.2% 10.7% 3.3% 2.9% 1.7% 0.9% 0.9% 0.1% 40.8%
# of recommendations 1,881 882 653 430 162 118 61 30 17 3 4,237
% of upgrades 61.9% 57.3% 57.0% 57.0% 64.8% 56.8% 52.5% 46.7% 11.8% 33.3% 59.2%
Market Capitalization (SEK, B) 116.98 9.47 3.63 1.76 0.98 0.60 0.37 0.19 0.08 0.03 3,507
Total Trading (SEK, B) 146.59 14.75 3.55 1.42 1.08 0.44 0.58 0.22 0.12 0.10 6,121
Coverage, value of trading 69.5% 50.3% 48.3% 40.1% 23.7% 17.2% 13.2% 5.8% 3.8% 1.9% 66.1%
Coverage, number of trades 58.0% 39.2% 34.7% 24.6% 14.8% 11.8% 7.0% 3.4% 1.8% 0.5% 45.5%
Firm-size decile
Total
Upgrades to 
buy or strong 
buy
Downgrades 
to sell or 
strong sell
All
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Table 3: Net Buying around Recommendation Revision Dates 
The coefficients in the first part of this table show the mean net purchases executed by the clients of recommending, informed, and uninformed brokers on the 
recommended stock in a number of week-long periods around the recommendation revision date, expressed in millions of Swedish kronor (SEK). These average 
net purchases are displayed for upgrades to buy or strong buy and downgrades to sell or strong sell revisions in event time, from 20 days before to 20 days after 
the recommendation revision date. Coefficient estimates and standard errors are obtained from two OLS regressions of weekly net purchases on indicator variables, 
one per event period-broker type pair. Regressions are conducted separately for upgrades to positive and downgrades to negative. The number of observations on 
each type of broker in each regression is denoted by nC. The second part of the table shows the mean weekly net purchases executed by the clients of 
informed/recommending brokers (recommending brokers are classed as informed brokers outside the recommendation window) and uninformed brokers on the 
recommended stock outside the +/- 20-day recommendation window. The sample period is January 1997 to June 2006. Standard errors are clustered on broker 
identity. USD 1 corresponds to about SEK 8 during the sample period. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Broker 
category (τ-20; τ−16) (τ-15; τ−11) (τ-10; τ−6) (τ-5; τ−1) (τ; τ+5) (τ+6; τ+10) (τ+11; τ+15) (τ+16; τ+20) n c
0.23 0.94 2.00 5.65 7.09 3.10 3.61 2.47
(0.28) (0.93) (1.74)* (4.51)*** (4.34)*** (3.47)*** (4.32)*** (2.56)**
0.28 0.28 -0.61 -0.11 -0.13 -0.25 0.21 -0.17
(0.84) (0.96) (-0.12) (-0.18) (-0.19) (-0.51) (0.59) (-0.46)
-0.14 -0.16 -0.03 -0.18 -0.18 -0.04 -0.27 -0.07
(-0.98) (-0.75) (-0.15) (-0.82) (-0.83) (-0.16) (-0.94) (-0.27)
1.62 -2.53 -1.61 -7.18 -3.00 -2.27 -0.27 -0.96
(1.04) (-1.60) (-1.93)* (-4.41)*** (-1.91)* (-2.28)** (-0.20) (-0.63)
0.07 0.25 0.04 -0.18 -0.09 0.29 -0.19 -0.08
(0.17) (0.53) (0.09) (-0.33) (-0.12) (0.81) (-0.48) (-0.17)
-0.01 0.09 0.07 0.34 0.12 -0.03 0.07 0.03
(-0.03) (0.65) (0.58) (2.90)*** (0.70) (-0.25) (0.61) (0.18)
0.02 -0.01
(0.74) (-0.49)
Uninformed 48,847
Five-day period average outside of the (τ-20; τ+20) Event Window
Informed            
(Recommending) Uninformed
Event period
Upgrades to 
buy or strong 
buy
Recommen-
ding 2,507
Informed 29,092
Uninformed 71,034
Downgrades 
to sell or 
strong sell
Recommen-
ding 1,730
Informed 18,921
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Table 4: Abnormal Portfolio Profits of Recommending Brokers' Clients 
This table shows the aggregate daily, and per recommendation, abnormal profits of recommending brokers' clients 
around recommendation revision dates. Aggregate daily profits are measured using all trades channelled through the 
recommending broker over three different windows around recommendation revision dates: (τ - 20; τ + 20), (τ - 10; τ 
+ 10), and (τ - 5; τ + 5). Within a given calendar day, daily profits from several recommendations are aggregated, 
rather than averaged, so wider windows do not necessarily result in monotonically increasing or decreasing profits if 
positions taken outside the narrower windows are not systematically profitable or unprofitable. Per recommendation 
profits are calculated by aggregating daily profits over the entire sample period and dividing that number by the 
number of recommendation revisions that generated them (the resulting figure represents a per window, not per day, 
profit). In the second part of the table abnormal profits are decomposed into pre- and post-recommendation revision 
date profits by selecting only the transactions executed by the recommending broker before or after the recorded 
recommendation revision date. The table also reports results for big (decile one) and small (deciles two to ten) 
recommended firms in the sample separately. Profits are expressed in Swedish kronor (SEK). USD 1 corresponds to 
about SEK 8 during the sample period, January 1997 to June 2006. t-statistics based on Newey-West (1987) standard 
errors, robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
  
Recs. (τ-5; τ+5) (τ-10; τ+10) (τ-20; τ+20) Recs. (τ-5; τ+5) (τ-10; τ+10) (τ-20; τ+20)
All 2,507 466,971 477,771 535,652 1730 37,565 -106,567 -152,170
Recommendations (2.70)*** (2.30)** (1.94)* (0.28) (-0.45) (-0.42)
Per Recommendation 442,011 453,377 510,226 51,224 -145,559 -208,816
Timing
2,507 223,292 174,684 246,710 1730 -845 -80,567 -145,959
(2.25)** (1.12) (1.05) (-0.01) (-0.43) (-0.46)
Per Recommendation 211,446 166,393 235,000 -1,154 -110,605 -200,377
2,507 241,606 300,782 278,614 1730 26,052 -35,525 6,089
(2.11)** (2.48)** (2.05)** (0.41) (-0.41) (0.05)
Per Recommendation 228,596 284,826 263,834 35,751 -50,123 8,360
Firm Size
Small Firms 1,366 82,593 98,856 82,364 1027 -6,790 -21,345 -46,013
(1.68)* (1.71)* (1.11) (-0.35) (-0.70) (-0.86)
Per Recommendation 144,388 165,541 128,693 -15,789 -49,632 -61,763
Big Firms 1,141 384,378 378,915 453,288 703 44,355 -85,222 -106,157
(2.46)** (1.96)** (1.72)* (0.37) (-0.33) (-0.29)
Per Recommendation 798,323 797,974 966,996 149,122 -285,697 -423,643
Post-Recommendation 
Date (τ; τ+δ)
Upgrades to buy or strong buy
Pre-Recommendation 
Date (τ-δ; τ-1)
Downgrades to sell or strong sell
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Table 5: Abnormal Portfolio Profits across Broker Categories 
The table shows average abnormal profits per recommendation event for the clients of recommending, informed, and 
uninformed brokers. Abnormal profits are measured over a (τ - 5; τ + 5) window around the recommendation revision 
date. Daily abnormal profits for these three groups of investors in the mentioned window of a recommendation change 
are aggregated over the entire sample period and divided by the number of recommendation revisions and brokers that 
generated them. The resulting figure, reported in the table, represents a per window, recommendation, and broker 
profit. For informed and uninformed brokers we also provide the aggregate profits of all brokers in each of these two 
groups per window and recommendation. On average, there are 13 informed brokers and 30 uninformed brokers active 
during the recommendation window. The profits are decomposed into pre- and post-recommendation revision date 
profits by selecting only the transactions executed by the broker group before or after the recorded recommendation 
revision date. Profits are expressed in Swedish kronor (SEK). USD 1 corresponds to about SEK 8 during the sample 
period, January 1997 to June 2006. t-statistics based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors, robust to 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Total Profits Per Rec. 442,011 -25,792 -3,437 51,224 47,865 -21,623
(τ-5; τ+5) (2.70)*** (-0.88) (-0.27) (0.28) (0.79) (-0.87)
All Brokers in Group -338,569 -103,442 600,934 -652,158
Per Rec. 211,446 -3,192 -5,634 -1,154 49,864 -20,719
(τ-5; τ−1) (2.25)** (-0.15) (-0.60) (-0.01) (1.06) (-1.08)
All Brokers in Group -41,879 -169,567 625,046 -623,892
Per Rec. 228,596 -21,707 1,869 35,751 -1,901 -395
(τ; τ+5) (2.11)** (-1.34) (0.38) (0.41) (-0.08) (-0.05)
All Brokers in Group -284,854 56,258 -23,859 -11,892
Downgrades to sell or strong sell
Rec. Broker Informed Uninformed
Pre-Recommendation     
Profits
Post-Recommendation 
Profits
UninformedInformedRec. Broker
Upgrades to buy or strong buy
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Table 6: Abnormal Portfolio Profits of Recommending Brokers' Clients – Earnings Announcement 
Dates and Clustering of Recommendations 
This table shows average abnormal profits obtained by the clients of recommending brokers for recommendations 
classified according to whether they were issued in the neighbourhood of an earnings announcement date or not (Panel 
A) and, separately, according to whether they cluster with other recommendations or not (Panel B). In all cases 
abnormal profits are measured over a (τ - 5; τ + 5) window around the recommendation revision date. The average 
reported profit represents a per window and recommendation profit. In Panel A, recommendations are classified 
according to whether they were issued inside or outside a 10-day window centered on the earnings announcement 
date. In Panel B, they are classified according to their proximity to other recommendation revisions using four different 
definitions detailed in the paper. Profits are expressed in Swedish kronor (SEK). USD 1 corresponds to about SEK 8 
during the sample period, January 1997 to June 2006. t-statistics based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors, robust 
to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, are presented in parentheses. The table also reports the number of 
recommendations in each category and the average size decile of the recommended firms in each group. *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Recs. Avg. Size Decile Abnormal Profits Recs. Avg. Size Decile Abnormal Profits
(τ-5; τ+5) (τ-5; τ+5)
Earnings Announcement Date
750,300 -206,444
(1.89)* (-0.48)
336,995 125,968
(1.97)** (0.58)
Diff. [0.35] [0.48]
Clustered/Isolated Recommendations
342,034 -59,999
(1.28) (-0.13)
501,374 121,013
(2.55)** (1.00)
Diff. [0.62] [0.70]
Density of the Cluster
517,892 -433,792
(1.92)* (-1.01)
403,637 255,105
(1.90)* (1.18)
Diff. [0.75] [0.16]
Time from Nearest Recommendation
Short 503,009 -313,437
(2.00)** (-0.87)
Long 402,994 255,420
(1.92)* (1.12)
Diff. [0.76] [0.18]
Time from Previous Recommendation
Short 555,563 -329,774
(1.79)* (-0.97)
Long 369,743 264,033
(2.27)** (1.11)
Diff. [0.59] [0.15]
2.4
2.0
Panel A: Earnings Announcement Dates
Inside +/-5-day 
Window
637 2.3 389 2.5
Panel B: Clustering of Recommendations
Outside +/-5-day 
Window
1,870 2.2 1341 2.3
621
1109
1063
2.0
2.6
2.6
1.8
1.6
2.6
1,532
620
1110
1218
978
1,529
975
2.4
2.0
2.4
2.1
2.6
Low Density
Upgrades to buy or strong buy
High Density
Downgrades to sell or strong sell
Clustered
Isolated
934
1,573
667
842
1,665
512
1.8
2.7
1.9
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2719737 
 43 
Table 7: Abnormal Buy and Sell Volume for Recommending Brokers 
This table shows recommending brokers' average abnormal buy and sell volume in the recommended stock over three 
different windows around the recommendation date: (τ - 20; τ + 20), (τ - 10; τ + 10), and (τ - 5; τ + 5). The figures are 
further decomposed into pre- and post- recommendation revision dates abnormal buy and sell volume and according 
to recommended firm size. Abnormal buy volume (for upgrades to buy or strong buy) and abnormal sell volume (for 
downgrades to sell or strong sell) are estimated using the regression specified in Equation (5). The reported figures 
are abnormal volume averages per recommendation and window obtained from 2,507 upgrades and 1,730 
downgrades. Abnormal buy and sell volume is expressed in Swedish kronor (SEK). USD 1 corresponds to about SEK 
8 during the sample period, January 1997 to June 2006. t-statistics (in parenthesis) robust to heteroscedasticity and 
general forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence are computed using Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard 
errors. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
  
Recs. (τ-5; τ+5) (τ-10; τ+10) (τ-20; τ+20) Recs. (τ-5; τ+5) (τ-10; τ+10) (τ-20; τ+20)
All Recommendations 2,507 43,633,183 50,513,568 55,769,184 1730 28,372,091 29,567,349 24,274,341
(5.80)*** (5.01)*** (3.79)*** (2.41)** (2.20)** (1.39)
Timing
2,507 22,469,670 27,597,740 28,290,780 1730 19,520,120 22,406,440 23,362,040
(4.08)*** (3.75)*** (2.80)*** (2.15)** (2.26)** (1.88)*
2,507 21,166,242 22,919,787 27,480,558 1730 8,858,874 7,172,910 942,011
(5.72)*** (4.29)*** (3.34)*** (1.79)* (1.03) (0.10)
Firm Size
Small Firms 1,366 15,382,026 16,515,410 18,103,882 1027 3,501,819 163,671 -5,875,849
(6.24)*** (5.23)*** (4.14)*** (1.78)* (0.05) (-1.48)
Big Firms 1,141 77,495,319 91,269,549 100,934,743 703 64,871,114 72,729,846 68,530,024
(4.90)*** (4.20)*** (3.17)*** (2.30)** (2.28)** (1.63)
Upgrades to buy or strong buy Downgrades to sell or strong sell
Pre-Recommendation 
Date (τ-δ; τ-1)
Post-Recommendation 
Date (τ; τ+δ)
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Table 8: Commission Rates and Broker Revenue around Recommendation Revision Dates 
Panel A of this table presents average commission rates, in basis points (bp), calculated from 85,803 stock market 
transactions from January 2002 to June 2006. These transactions are classified into three time windows centered on 
the recommendation date: (τ - 20; τ +20), (τ - 10; τ + 10), and (τ - 5; τ + 5). The sorting is done separately for purchases 
executed around upgrades to buy or strong buy and sales executed around downgrades to sell or strong sell. The p-
values of a test of differences in paid commissions between all transactions and those executed in each of these time 
windows is reported in square brackets. Panel B reports estimated abnormal roundtrip commissions paid based on the 
regressions for abnormal volume in Table 7 under the assumption that the recommended trade (purchase for upgrade 
and sale for downgrade) paid the average commission rate in the relevant window, and liquidation of the position was 
done at the full sample average commission rate. Panel C reports the estimated fraction of total profits captured by 
brokers by dividing total commissions by estimated profits in Table 5. p-values and t-statistics are based on robust 
standard errors clustered at the broker level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
 
 
  
Panel A: Commissions paid for purchases and sales during downgrades and upgrades
All +/-5 +/-10 +/-20
Commission (bp) 13.7 17.6 15.5 14.5
[0.02]** [0.29] [0.63]
Commission (bp) 13.6 14.0 14.2 14.4
[0.72] [0.73] [0.72]
Panel B: Estimated average abnormal commissons paid (SEK)
N +/-5 +/-10 +/-20
2,507 148,235 156,404 161,504
(3.86)*** (3.09)*** (2.22)**
1,730 78,713 83,702 69,958
(3.13)*** (3.04)*** (1.55)
Category All 4,237 119,848 126,719 124,125
(4.33)*** (3.81)*** (2.31)**
Big firms 1,844 234,277 253,003 274,789
(3.49)*** (2.99)*** (1.84)*
Small firms 2,393 31,671 29,407 26,668
(3.74)*** (3.48)*** (2.73)**
Panel C: Estimated commissons as a share of total profits
N +/-5 +/-10 +/-20
Upgrades to buy or strong buy 2,507 34% 34% 32%
Downgrades to sell or strong sell 1,730 154% neg. neg.
Category All 4,237 42% 61% 57%
Big firms 1,844 43% 66% 63%
 Small firms 2,393 42% 40% 57%
Upgrades to buy 
or strong buy
Downgrades to 
sell or strong sell
Upgrades to buy 
or strong buy
Downgrades to 
sell or strong sell
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Figure 1: Cumulative Net Buying around Recommendation Revision Dates 
The figures show the cumulative net buying by the clients of recommending, informed, and uninformed brokers 
around recommendation revision dates. Cumulative net buying is measured in millions of Swedish kronor (SEK, M) 
and averaged over recommendations. Net buying is accumulated separately in event time for upgrades to buy or strong 
buy and downgrades to sell or strong sell. Results are shown separately for big (decile one) and small (deciles two to 
ten) recommended firms and for upgrades and downgrades. The sample contains 1,141 big firm recommendation 
upgrades to buy or strong buy, 1,366 small firm recommendation upgrades to buy or strong buy, 709 big firm 
recommendation downgrades to sell or strong sell and 1,027 recommendation downgrades to sell or strong sell. USD 
1 corresponds to about SEK 8 during the sample period, January 1997 to June 2006. 
 
 
  
A: Upgrades to buy or strong buy, big firms
C: Downgrades to sell or strong sell, big firms
B: Upgrades to buy or strong buy, small firms
D: Downgrades to sell or strong sell, small firms
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Figure 2: Abnormal Profits and Returns around Recommendation Revision Dates 
This figure shows cumulative abnormal profits and returns for transactions starting 20 trading days before the broker 
releases a buy or strong buy (sell or strong sell) recommendation that positively (negatively) revises an existing 
recommendation up until 20 trading days after that recommendation. Buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) are 
measured as the difference between raw buy and hold returns and the market return over the corresponding period. 
Abnormal profits are measured as the difference between raw profits and the profits that investors could have made 
by investing a similar amount in the market index. Each point in the abnormal profits line is computed as the average, 
across recommendations, of the cumulative abnormal profits obtained on transactions executed up until that event day, 
keeping the valuation horizon fixed. The reference price in the profits computation is, in all cases, the price prevailing 
20 trading days after the recommendation revision date. The reported figures are averages of 2,507 observations for 
upgrades to buy or strong buy, and 1,730 observations for downgrades to sell or strong sell. Profits are measured in 
millions of Swedish kronor (SEK, M). USD 1 corresponds to about SEK 8 during the sample period. 
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